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ABSTRACT
What is the virtue of protecting a false reputation? The thesis of this paper is that there is 
none. There is none, at least, that justifies the suppression of free speech. Yet, there is a growing 
trend to see the protection of reputation from truth as a key function of the so-called “right of 
privacy.” 
Unfortunately, people often do things that they are not proud of or do not want others to 
know about. Often, however, these are precisely the things that others want or need to know. For 
our own protection, each of us is better off being aware of the negative or less-than-flattering 
qualities of others with whom we deal.
The things that people say about each other are protected by the Constitution as much as 
any other form of expression. The Supreme Court has recognized repeatedly that the judgment 
embodied in the First Amendment is that the benefits of a free flow of information outweigh the 
costs and that those who speak truthfully cannot be made to do so at their peril. Therefore, 
disclosures of truthful information cannot, in the name of “privacy,” be constitutionally subjected 
to after-the-fact governmental determinations that they were not justified, unnecessary or even a 
crime.
Perhaps there are things that it is better for us not to see or hear. But the assumption of 
the First Amendment is that government should not be deciding these limitations on the free flow 
of information or what speech is important enough to be “worth it.” If, in the name of protecting 
privacy or reputations, government agencies can decide after the fact what is and is not 
legitimate negative information, self-censorship will abound and valuable information will 
suffer.
For a much more complete (and perhaps less contentious) treatment of privacy rights and the 
First Amendment, see my “Privacy and the Right of Free Expression,” available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1996581
Note: This paper is based on presentations at the annual conference of the Law and Society  
Association, held in Honolulu, HI on June 5-8 2012 and, at a conference, “Perspectives on 
Privacy,” held at Johannes-Gutenberg University, Mainz, Germany, on June 23-24, 2011.
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Privacy Rights: The Virtue of Protecting a False Reputation
by John A. Humbach, Pace Law School
White Plains, New York
jhumbach@law.pace.edu
What is the virtue of protecting a false reputation? The thesis of this article is that there is 
none. There is none, at least, that justifies the suppression of free speech. Yet, there is a growing 
trend to see protection for false reputations as a key function of the so-called “right of privacy,” 
especially outside the United States.1 Meanwhile, the Second Restatement of Torts § 652D seems 
to authorize such protection2 and, in any case, by imitation or the internationalization of forum 
shopping,3 the trend could affect the degree to which free speech is protected under the United 
States Constitution. It is a therefore trend that deserves examination.
The interests in privacy and in free expression are both important,4 but they are in 
fundamental tension with one another. Nobody likes to be talked about but everyone likes to talk, 
and the lives and doings of our fellow human beings are a primary topic of expressive discourse. 
When the talk turns into defamatory falsehood, the First Amendment allows a remedy.5 “[T]here 
is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.”6 Unflattering statements of truth, however, 
are another matter. 
Suppressing the expression of truth always has a cost. When human actions are premised 
on falsehood, they are less likely to produce the intended results. As a consequence, there is a 
predictable social cost in forcing individuals and institutions to make choices based on false 
information. There is, in addition, the personal cost to those who are denied the liberty to speak 
the truth. When government can deny a person the right to tell his or her own life’s story,7 it is an 
affront to the dignity and the personality of those whose words are suppressed, a subordination of 
1* This paper is based on a presentation at the Privacy Discussion Forum, Johannes-Gutenberg University, Mainz, 
Germany, June 23-24, 2011. For a fuller discussion of the constitutional considerations raised my companion paper 
Privacy, Property And The Right Of Free Expression: Private Information and the Right to Know, available at  
SSRN.
1 See infra text accompanying notes 42-52.
2 See infra text accompanying notes 53-55.
3 See, e.g., Dirk Voorhoof, Abuse of ‘forum shopping’ in defamation case and freedom of academic criticism, 
STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (Mar. 8 2011), available at http://strasbourgobservers.com/2011/03/08/abuse-of-
%E2%80%98forum-shopping%E2%80%99-in-defamation-case-and-freedom-of-academic-criticism/, describing 
Weiler, No. d’affaire 0718523043 (2011), available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/03/judgement-3-mars-2011.pdf; Doreen Carvajal, Britain, a destination for "libel tourism", 
N.Y.TIMES (Jan. 20, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/20/technology/20iht-
libel21.1.9346664.html. Even if such forum shopping has not been uniformly successful, just the prospect of being 
hauled into a distant foreign court can plausibly chill speech even if, after an expensive legal battle, the case may 
eventually be won. It is, of course, a short step from libel tourism to invasion-of-privacy tourism.
4 See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S.524, 533 (1989) (“press freedom and privacy rights are both ‘plainly 
rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our society’ 
5 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). Since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964), the imposition of defamation liability has been constitutionally limited in the case of public officials and 
figures and, in general, a fault-requirement as well as other limitations apply even in the case of non-public figures. 
See Russell Weaver and Donald Lively, UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 39-43 (3d ed. 2009). Nonetheless, 
defamatory falsehood itself is still considered to constitute a categorical exception to First Amendment protection. 
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010).
6 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340.
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natural personal development to the truth-suppressive policies of the state. It treats such persons, 
in effect, as a means for furthering the government’s policy of manipulating belief. Whether 
these costs and burdens on society and individuals are worth it would depend on how the 
utilitarian calculus works out in each particular situation. But there is no escaping that those who 
advocate truth suppression in the name of privacy are, in effect, insisting that a utilitarian 
calculus (or “balancing” test) be used and that freedom of speech should depend on it.8   
It is true that disseminating factual information can also have a cost. If the disclosures 
expose a false reputation, for example, they can prevent a person from reaping the advantages 
that accrue from hiding the truth. These advantages can be substantial because, in our encounters 
with one another, we must as a practical matter trust other people, at least to a degree, and this 
means reliance on reputation.9 When an undeserved reputation attracts unjustified trust, people 
can be induced to do things they otherwise would not do. Disclosure of truth takes away this 
advantage. But the fact that the truth may be a burden for the disingenuous is not a strong 
argument against it. “The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people 
that the benefits of its [speech-protective] restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs. 
Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis that some 
speech is not worth it.”10
  
The First Amendment states flatly that there shall be “no law… abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press.”11  As has frequently been observed, however, freedom of expression is 
not absolute and, in particular, “[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of 
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem.”12. Notably, although “the libelous” is on the list of items that that are 
historically excluded from First Amendment protection,13 the dissemination of truthful private 
information is not.14 What is more, the Supreme Court has warned, there is no “freewheeling 
authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment.”15 Just 
last term the Court passed up an opportunity to declare that there might be a First Amendment 
7 As occurred in the recent Esra case in Germany, where a partly autobiographical work of fiction was banned 
because it overly revealed “intimate” details about a person with whom the author had romantically interacted. 
Roman Esra, BVerfGE 119, 1 (2007). See Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Prosser‘s Privacy and the 
German Right of Personality: Are Four Privacy Torts Better than One Unitary Concept?, 98 CAL. L. REV. 925 
(2010).
8 The English Courts and the European Court of Human Rights both explicitly apply a balancing process to decide, 
as cases arise, whether free expression it worth it.  See, e.g., Re S., [2004] UKHL 47; [2005] 1 A.C. 593;  A. v. B., 
[2002] EWCA Civ 337, [2003] QB 195; Von Hannover v. Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1 at [58], [76] & [79] . The 
recent balancing revolution in the English courts is engagingly discussed in Andrew Tettenborn,“Confidence-Plus” 
And Human Rights: The Monstrous New Tort Of Breach Of Privacy, And What To Do About It (2011; forthcoming).
9 Or, at the very least, on the absence of a bad reputation.
10 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010).
11 U.S.CONST. AMEND. I. By its actual terms, the First Amendment applied only to Congress. However, it is now also 
applied to limit the power of the states to enact laws that restrict speech and the press. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
12 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
13 Id. But see supra note 5.
14 Except against government, the interest in privacy is not protected by the Constitution. See Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“the protection of a person's general right to privacy -- his right to be let alone by other 
people -- is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual States”).
15 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010), accord, Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 
4802 (2011).
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exclusion for truthful disclosures of private information, and it did not even hint that there was 
such a thing.16 In short, although the First Amendment leaves room for laws that exact liability 
for false statements that cause reputational harm, the Court has never recognized that persons can 
held liable for causing such harm with true statements. 
Neither, however, has the Supreme Court foreclosed the possibility of recovery for 
injurious truthful statements, at least not for cases where the speech does not involve a matter of 
public concern.17 Moreover, the right of privacy defined in the Second Restatement of Torts 
seems, in some of its particulars, aimed precisely at imposing such liability. Specifically, 
Restatement § 652D authorizes damages for any person who suffers an injury because somebody 
“gives publicity to a matter concerning the [person’s] private life” if “the matter publicized is of 
a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate 
concern to the public.”18 The open question is the extent to which the application of § 652D of 
the Restatement is constitutional.19 
One thing is clear, namely, that the last qualification of § 652D (“not of legitimate 
concern to the public”) is not just an option. It expresses, rather, a constitutionally mandated 
limitation on government’s power to impose liability for disseminating truthful information 
about people and their lives. Where truthful disclosures deal with matters of public concern, 
liability for the expression is not constitutionally permissible.20 
The key precedent is Bartnicki v. Vopper.21 In Bartnicki, an unknown person intercepted 
and illegally recorded a telephone conversation during which intemperate comments were made 
in connection with tense labor negotiations between a teachers’ union and board of education.22 
The recording was anonymously provided to the head of a local citizens organization, who then 
forwarded it to a radio station. The radio station played the recording on the air. The individuals 
whose private conversation was thus publicly revealed sued for damages under state and federal 
wiretap laws23 which prohibited, among other things, the interception of “any wire, oral, or 
electronic communication”24 and the disclosure of the contents of any such interception.25 The 
Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional to apply the wiretap laws to prevent disclosures 
of intercepted private conversation by people not complicit in the illegal interception.  
16 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4794 (2011) (striking down a Vermont that prohibited the sale, 
disclosure or use of data identifying pharmaceutical prescribers for marketing purposes).
17 See Barnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001) (specifically leaving the question open). 
18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652D (1977).
19 The Restatement acknowledges that it is an open question at “Special Note on Relation of § 652D to the First 
Amendment to the Constitution.” Id. 
20 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 534-35.
21 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
22 Apparently, the key statement, made by the union president to the union’s chief negotiator, was “we’re gonna 
have to go to their, their homes . . . [t]o blow off their front porches . . .” (referring to the board of education). Id. at 
518-19.  
23 18 U.S.C. 2511. 
24 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a).
25 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c).
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The Court in Barnicki laid considerable stress on the fact that the disclosures in question 
were about a “matter of public concern.”26 In drawing this distinction between public and non-
public concerns, the Court somewhat echoed a line of late twentieth-century defamation cases in 
which it had cut back on the “breathing space”27 that is provided for non-malicious defamatory 
utterances.28 Under these cases, the protection of defamatory falsehood is greatest in the case of 
statements about public officials and figures and the protection is least when the defamatory 
speech relates only to private persons and matters of private concern.29 
The unsettled question is whether an absence of public concern is a reason for according 
a lesser measure of constitutional protection to truthful speech. On one hand, as recently as last 
term the Court in Snyder v. Phelps offered the obiter dictum that “restricting speech on purely 
private matters does not implicate the same constitutional concerns as limiting speech on matters 
of public interest.”30 On the other hand, despite the Court’s continued lip service to the public 
concern/private concern distinction, it has also roundly disparaged the workability of the 
distinction as a constitutional test31—a position that still apparently holds. And, in Bartnicki, the 
Court pointedly left open the question of whether there ever can be a privacy interest32 “strong 
enough to justify [restrictions on] disclosures of … domestic gossip or other information of 
purely private concern.”33 In spite of the dictum of Snyder v. Phelps, therefore, it seems a fair 
conclusion that the question remains open as of now as to whether truthful disclosures on private 
matters can constitutionally be suppressed.34
There are, however, at least two reasons why the Court should not withhold First 
Amendment protection from truthful statements that people make about one another, even if the 
information conveyed arguably intrudes upon interest in “privacy.” One is that we all necessarily 
rely on our knowledge of the qualities, character, conduct and propensities of the people around 
us and, to put it bluntly, on our awareness of the adverse ways in which they might affect us. 
26 Id. at 533-35.
27 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964).
28 Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (no showing of actual malice required); Dun & Bradstreet v. 
Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985)(presumptive as well as punitive damages allowed without proof of actual 
malice). See also Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 
(1979). As defamation cases, these cases are not strictly speaking direct precedents for cases that do not involve any 
categorical exclusion from First Amendment protection. They are not, that is to say, direct precedents for cases in 
which the opposing interest to be served is privacy. See supra text accompanying notes 11-16.
29 Id. In the case of public officials and figures, for example, liability is constitutionally permissible only if the 
statements were made with “actual malice.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
30 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011). 
31 Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974).
32 The particular privacy interest the Court appeared to have in mind here was the interest in “privacy of 
communication.” 532 U.S. at 532-33. This was, however, the only privacy interest that Bartnicki indicated might 
conceivably be strong enough to outweigh free-expression interests at all.
33 532 U.S. at 533, citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967), which likewise left open the question of 
whether “truthful publication of private matters unrelated to public affairs can be constitutionally proscribed.” Id.
34 Even though the Court in Snyder said at one point that “this case turns largely on whether that speech is of public 
or private concern,” 131 S. Ct. at 1215, the Court cautioned later that “the reach of our opinion here is limited by the 
particular facts before us,” id. at 1230. Thus, while the Court clearly said that public-concern nature of the speech in 
Snyder meant that First Amendment was required, it did not ever say (and it seemed to expressly exclude) any 
holding that private-concern speech was not protected. And, indeed, on a fair reading of the case, the arguments for 
and against protecting purely private interest speech were not even considered by the Court—quite properly, 
moreover, because the record did not raise the question. Id.
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That is to say, people want and need to know about the negative features of others with whom 
they deal and upon whom, out of necessity or convenience, they must confer at least some degree 
of trust. The other reason for broadly protecting such truthful statements is that the First 
Amendment should be deemed to apply from the ground up, to protect all of the people, not just 
the ones who engage in “serious” political debate or other high-minded “serious” discourse. 
These two reasons will be considered in turn.
Protecting False Reputations and the Need to Know. As noted in the previous section, 
the right of privacy defined in the Second Restatement of Torts imposes liability on any person 
who causes injury by giving “publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another” if the 
matter is reasonably “offensive”35 and “is not of legitimate concern to the public.”36 A statement 
is “publicity” if it is communicated “to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter 
must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.”37 In a pre-Internet 
document (as the Restatement was), this narrowing definition of “publicity” may have succeeded 
in significantly limiting potential liability for ordinary gossip.38 Most people did not, until 
recently, have much personal ability to communicate with “many persons” and, as a practical 
matter, “publicity” was primarily the preserve of the press. Things have, however, changed. To 
provide some context, it might be useful to consider some kinds of modern Internet-age factual 
situations in which speech would be suppressed under the Restatement’s rule.
Last year someone in suburban New York circulated a “Smut List” containing the names 
of nearly 100 purportedly sexually-active high school girls.39 The list, which appeared on 
Facebook and quickly attracted thousands of “likes,” caused outrage among school officials, who 
denounced it as a “reprehensible act of cyberbullying.”40 The local police chief promised “to 
prosecute to the fullest extent of the law.”41
Then there is the free-speech adventure of plumber Ian Puddick.42 Distraught to discover 
that his wife was having sex with a superior at the office, Puddick “set up a series of websites, a 
Twitter account and a blog to draw attention to the affair.”43  This led to police raids by an elite 
35 It is well established that offensiveness alone is not a sufficient ground for removing First Amendment protection. 
See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988); Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1989). Therefore, this prong of the Restatement rule does not insulate the it from 
constitutional invalidity, and the element of “offensiveness” will not be discussed further here.
36 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652D (1977). 
37 Id. at cmt. a. 
38 Specifically, the Restatement distinguished “publicity,” as it uses the term, from the much broader defamation 
concept of publication. “Publication,” it is explained in the comments, “includes any communication by the 
defendant to a third person.” Id.
39 Randi Weiner, Harrison cops investigate source of ‘Smut List’, THE JOURNAL NEWS, Mar. 19, 2011, at 3A; see also 
Andrew Klappholz, ‘Smut List’, THE JOURNAL NEWS, Mar. 23, 2011, at 1A.
40 Weiner, supra note 39.
41 Klappholz, supra note 39, at 8A.
42 See Caroline Davies, “Plumber Ian Puddick Cleared of Harassing Wife’s Lover on Internet, ” guardian.co.uk (June 
17, 2011), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/jun/17/ian-puddick-internet-cleared-twitter; Jamie 
Doward, ‘Cuckold’ case will test the limits of the internet, available at  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/jun/12/puddick-harassment-internet-law. While the case arose under 
English law, the facts are presented here as the kind that might arise under the Restatement § 652D. 
43 Doward, supra note 42. 
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“serious crimes unit” and a criminal prosecution for “harassment.”44  Although the case was 
ultimately dismissed after an extended period of uncertainty for Puddick, it was not exactly, to 
quote Puddick, a “victory for free speech.”45 For though Puddick’s lawyer said the case was 
about his “right to express his feelings about another person's immorality,”46 the free expression 
issue was apparently resolved on different grounds, namely, that the “three websites with the 
graphic details about the affair … could not be proved [to have been issued by] Mr Puddick.”47
As a third example, consider the facts of Mosley v. News Group Newpapers Limited,48 in 
which a prominent figure in professional auto racing complained of a published story and images 
(Internet and print) that showed him engaged in sado-masochistic sex play with a number of 
alleged prostitutes, a disclosure that was damaging to his reputation. Although there was 
apparently nothing untrue about the information disseminated (and to that extent, the damaged 
reputation was apparently a false one), court stressed that the case was about privacy, not 
defamation,49 and awarded the plaintiff a judgment for £60,000.50 
Finally, there is the Esra case recently decided by Germany’s Constitutional Court, where 
a partly autobiographical work of fiction was banned because it revealed overly “intimate” 
details about a person with whom the author had been romantically involved.51 Even accepting 
that the book in question went way over the line in its personal revelations, it can be reasonably 
expected that future authors, worried about how intimate is “too intimate,” will take the safer 
course and be continuingly chilled in their exercise of free expression.52  
While three of these four factual situations were litigated outside the United States, all of 
them are examples of situations in which it seems entirely reasonable to expect that Restatement 
§ 652D would support suppression of the truth in order to protect a false reputation.53 What is 
more, none of the situations seems to involve a “matter of public concern” within the meaning of 
44 Id.
45 Rebecca Camber, “Victory for free speech as cuckolded husband is cleared of using internet to harass wife's  
millionaire lover,” Mail Online (Jun. 17 2011), available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2004804/Ian-
Puddick-cleared-using-internet-harass-wifes-millionaire-lover.html.
46 Doward, supra note 42. 
47 Camber, supra note 45. 
48 [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB); [2008] E.M.L.R. 20, available at 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2008/1777.html.
49 Id. at ¶ 214. 
50 Id. I am grateful to Andrew Tettenborn for bringing this case to my attention in his excellent summary of the 
current English law in Andrew Tettenborn,“Confidence-Plus” And Human Rights: The Monstrous New Tort Of  
Breach Of Privacy, And What To Do About It (2012; forthcoming).
51 Roman Esra, BVerfGE 119, 1 (2007). See Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Prosser‘s Privacy and the 
German Right of Personality: Are Four Privacy Torts Better than One Unitary Concept?, 98 CAL. L. REV. 925 
(2010).
52 It is not far-fetched to assume that virtually all sex scenes in novels (at least, all that are believable) are at least 
partly “autobiographical.” Of course, this may not cause serious legal jeopardy for authors who have had many 
lovers (so that individual identification is difficult), but for those who are relatively chaste, one wonders. 
53 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652D (1977). Even though the plaintiff in the Mosley case was no doubt a 
somewhat less protected “voluntary public figure,” see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652D cmt. e (1977), the 
Restatement’s right of privacy would apparently nonetheless impose liability (suppress the disclosure) because 
“[t]here may be some intimate details of her life, such as sexual relations, which even [a voluntary public figure] is 
entitled to keep to herself.” Id. at cmt. h.
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Bartnicki54 or any of the Supreme Court’s other cases. They all involve, rather, “disclosures of … 
domestic gossip or other information of purely private concern.”55 
The question is, accordingly, whether the principle of Bartnicki, applicable to matters of 
pubic concern, ought to be extended to provide First Amendment protection to mere “domestic 
gossip or other information of purely private concern.” In deciding that question, a consideration 
that naturally comes to mind is the extent to which such speech has any value. This may or may 
not be an obsolete way of thinking about free speech in view of the Court’s recent reasoning in 
United States v. Stevens, where it said that even “[w]holly neutral futilities . . . come under the 
protection of free speech as fully as do Keats’ poems or Donne’s sermons.”56 The fact remains, 
however, that even content-based restrictions on speech57 are constitutionally permissible if the 
laws that in question pass strict scrutiny.58 And in deciding whether an application of law to 
protect a false reputation serves a “compelling interest,” as strict scrutiny requires,59 it is 
inevitable that the value of protecting the false reputation will be pitted against the value of 
factual disclosures that could puncture it.
As an initial reaction, most of us would have no trouble condemning the disseminators of 
a ‘Smut List’ of local teenage girls willing to have sex. It is not, however, hard to imagine that at 
least some people might legitimately value the kind of information that such a list can convey.60 
For example, would the mother of a teenage girl have a legitimate interest in learning similar 
facts about the boy who is taking her daughter to a “party” this Friday night? It is far from self-
evident that she would not. Is it not legitimate for someone, such another mother, to tell her if the 
boy is known to be a sexually active lothario with many “conquests” to his name? Is this a kind 
of disclosure that the Constitution should protect only if it is delivered one-to-one? Similarly, in 
this era of burgeoning STDs,61 it is far from self-evident that the mothers of teenage boys might 
not have a legitimate interest in knowing whether the girls their sons go out with are sexually 
active. Even when information relates to plausibly legitimate concerns, however, the problem is 
that its dissemination, particularly if it is truthful, can damage false reputations. That is to say, it 
invades the right to privacy.
54 See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 525 & 534-35.
55 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533, citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967), which likewise left open the 
question of whether “truthful publication of private matters unrelated to public affairs can be constitutionally 
proscribed.” Id.
56 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591 (2010), quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 528 (1948) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
57 A restriction that singles out speech disclosing information about persons’ private lives is, rather plainly, “content-
based.  See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)(striking down a speech restriction adopted “to protect the 
dignity of foreign diplomatic personnel by shielding them from speech that is critical of their governments”).  That 
is to say, the restriction’s “justification focuses only on the content of the speech.” Id.
58 See Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4802 (2011); United States v. Playboy Entertainment 
Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
59 Id.
60 Assuming, of course, that the list was accurate. It should be stressed that the discussion in this paper is focused on 
the tension between the right of privacy and First Amendment interests. Obviously, very different concerns are 
raised by disseminations of defamatory false information. 
61 Sexually transmitted diseases. In a study reported in 2008, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
found that “at least one in 4 American girls has a sexually transmitted disease.” Associated Press, “1 in 4 teen girls  
has sexually transmitted disease” (Mar. 11.2008), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23574940/ns/health-
kids_and_parenting/t/teen-girls-has-sexually-transmitted-disease/ 
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Everyone would like to control his or her own public image.62 People sometimes do 
things in private that they are not proud of and do not want others to know about. Often, 
however, these are precisely the things that others want or need to know. We are better off 
knowing about others’ activities that may evidence their character, qualities, and propensities. 
Parents want to know about the people who interact with their children, businesspeople want to 
know about their business counterparts, people in dating relationships want to know about their 
romantic partners, and so on.63 Our natural curiosity about other people’s negatives may, indeed, 
be nature’s way of keeping us alert to potentially valuable data. 
What is more, it is impossible to say ex ante which particular bits of information may 
later be relevant or useful. It is therefore hard to imagine how government64 could reliably 
specify what kinds of private information people have a legitimate reason to know and which 
ones can be communicated only at one’s own legal peril. Every bit of information about the 
others with whom we deal, especially the negative information, is potentially relevant and useful. 
Thus, the question arises whether it can be consistent with good legal policy, not to mention the 
constitutional protection of speech, to make the dissemination of truthful information about other 
people selectively punishable—a risky activity that one does at one’s own peril: Should the 
disclosures that people make about other people without the latters’ consent be subject to after-
the-fact governmental determinations that the disclosure was not justified, unnecessary or even a 
crime?
The judgment embodied in the First Amendment is that the benefits of a free flow of 
information outweigh the costs.65 And the Supreme Court has recognized repeatedly that assuring 
the free flow of information requires that “breathing space” be allowed so that those who speak 
do not do so at their peril.66 If, in the name of protecting privacy or reputations, we let 
government personnel decide after the fact which communications of negative information were 
and were not legitimate, with the latter being punished by liability or as a crime, self-censorship 
will abound and information will suffer. 
62 And, it should be stressed, there is nothing per se reprehensible in wanting to do so. Indeed, I tend to agree with 
Judge Alex Kosinski and Professor David Han that First Amendment also includes a right to try, by means of free 
expression, to define and shape the contours of one’s own public persona. See David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies  
And The First Amendment’s Protection Of Self-Defining Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming), available at  
SSRN http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1945248 & United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.2d 673-74 
(9th Cir. 2010)(Kosinski, J. concurring in denial of rehearing en banc). We all have complex personalities, a mix of 
aspects that are lovable and of others that are not, and it would strike to the core of liberty and autonomy for the law 
to regulate which aspects of ourselves we are allowed to stress, to downplay, to distort or even to fabricate. To 
recognize and support this form of self-defining expression decidedly does not, however, justify suppressing the 
expression of other persons who might want to present additional or alternative interpretations of an individual’s 
personality.
63 Even though there may be no particular “public interest” in these kinds of topics of communication, such “daily 
life matters” (as Professor Volokh dubbed them in his excellent analysis) may, for most people most of the time, be 
the ones that really count and at to which they most need information.  See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech,  
Information Privacy and the Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1, 32-39 (2000). 
64 I.e., the law.
65 Cf. supra text accompanying note 10.
66 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011), quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988); New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964). 
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The First Amendment Protects Everybody, not Just Elite “Public Interest” 
Discourse. Even if it is so that only “the publication of truthful information of public concern” 
“implicates the core purposes of the First Amendment,”67 and “most of what we say to one 
another” lacks “serious value,”68 it is all “still sheltered from government regulation.”69 That is to 
say, the protection of the First Amendment applies not only to high-minded elites engaged in “a 
meaningful dialogue of ideas” or a “robust debate of public issues” having “serious” political 
value70 but to everyone, from the ground up. Just as a “consumer's concern for the free flow of 
commercial speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political dialogue,”71 so 
also an ordinary person’s concern for the free flow of information about “daily life matters”72 
may be what is of keenest interest, not to mention of greatest personal value. Ordinary people do 
not always talk about matters of public concern, but that does not mean that what they say is not 
important to themselves. 
What is more, as members of a social species, the character, qualities, conduct and 
propensities of other people are almost inevitably matters of primary interest. Some people talk 
about atoms the stars or the Federal Reserve policy but for most of us the number-one topic of 
conversation is other people. Our fellow human beings are the topic of primary concern. In 
addition to the self-protective role that such discourse can have,73 “domestic gossip or other 
information of purely private concern” play an undoubtedly important role in social control. 
When people do things they are not proud of and do not want others to know about, there is a 
reason: The knowledge and chatter of others is a sanction in itself. Talking about one another is 
the way we establish shared values, strengthen feelings of community and reinforce the 
expectations and norms that are the core of social cohesion. Even when people are not discussing 
the next election or national health policy, their talk about other people is socially indispensable. 
There are, in short, good policy reasons why communications about matters of non-public 
concern—even “domestic gossip or other information of purely private concern”—should 
receive First Amendment protection. Most of the information that is highly important to most 
people does not relate to matters of “public” concern—at least not in any narrow sense. Even 
though people’s lives are affected by what is done by government, most are vastly more affected 
by the acts of the ordinary people who live around them and with whom they directly interact. 
The average person’s interest in information about the qualities, character, conduct and 
propensities of the people who surround her is not only legitimate; it most often the most 
relevant interest of all. That is why “[f]reedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic 
function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate 
to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.”74 
67 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533-34.
68 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591 (2010).
69 Id.
70 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011).
71 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4794 (2011), quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 
(1977). See also United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410-411(2001) (“those whose business and 
livelihood depend in some way upon the product involved no doubt deem First Amendment protection to be just as 
important for them as it is for other discrete, little noticed groups”).
72 See supra note 62.
73 See supra text accompanying notes 60-65.
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We may sometimes bemoan the fact that people find juicy gossip of such compelling 
interest. Arguments can be constructed why our neighbors’ private lives should be none of our 
business. And indeed, there are no doubt many things are none of our business. A right of free 
expression does however not mean a right to pry or hack into others’ private affairs or records.75 
Nor does it mean that people should be compelled to reveal their secrets.76 What means is that, 
once information is out, the situation is different.77 Free speech is a constitutional right, not just 
of the politically active and elites, but of ordinary people as well. Topics of widely shared private 
concern are matters of public concern.78 For ordinary people in their ordinary daily lives, 
knowing about the activities, choices and, ultimately, character of those who live around them 
can have enormous personal consequences for both their private and “public” decisions and, 
therefore, be a matter of utmost concern, even if not a government-recognized “public” 
concern.79 
Conclusion. It is the thesis of this article that there is no virtue in protecting a false 
reputation. Despite the possibilities presented in the Second Restatement of Torts and the 
growing trend of cases from Europe, the Supreme Court should resist the urge to find new 
reasons in a so-called “right of privacy” to suppress the expression of truth. The world has a long 
history of governments deciding which facts the people should know and which they should not. 
And perhaps there are some things that it is better for us not to see or hear. But the assumption of 
the First Amendment is that government should not be deciding these restrictions on the free 
flow of information or, indeed, even what speech is important enough to be “worth it.”80. 
74 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967)(emphasis added), quoting  Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 
(1940).
75 In Barnicki, for example, there was no question that the law against interception of communications was 
constitutional. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 524-25.
76 Cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (striking down compelled speech); Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of 
Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)(striking down compelled publication requirement in 
newspaper). But cf. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177 (2004)(upheld compelled speech under the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, but did not discuss the First Amendment).  
77 Cf. id. at 526-28.
78 Cf. Justice Holmes’ classic put down of the public interest in private home ownership (which he decided was 
ultimately not worthy of protecting): “This is the case of a single private house. No doubt there is a public interest 
even in this….” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
79 Because of the invidious discrimination that still is felt by members of sexual minorities, one area of special 
concern may be the interest that some “LGBT plaintiffs understandably assert in … ‘selective disclosure’ of their 
sexual orientations or identities.” Anita L. Allen, Privacy Torts: Unreliable Remedies for LGBT Plaintiffs, 98 Ca. L. 
Rev. 1711, 1716 (2010). An argument can be made for example that, as long as people discriminate invidiously, 
government has an interest in forbidding the dissemination of information used in doing so. Like most such 
discrimination, however, this current situation is (one hopes) a transitional problem and, as such, it can be managed 
transitionally rather than as a pretext for structuring foundational limitations on the basic liberty of free expression. 
80 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010).
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